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Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of a generic finite set and points out
that a consistent and significant interpretation of the grossone, ① notation of
Yarolslav D. Sergeyev is that ① takes the role of a generic natural number.
This means that ① is not itself a natural number, yet it can be treated as one
and used in the generic expression of finite sets and finite formulas, giving a
new power to algebra and algorithms that embody this usage. In this view,
N= {1,2,3, · · · ,①− 2,①− 1,①}
is not an infinite set, it is a symbolic structure representing a generic finite
set. We further consider the concept of infinity in categories. An object A
in a given category C is infinite relative to that category if and only if there
is a injection J : A −→ A in C that is not a surjection. In the category of
sets this recovers the usual notion of infinity. In other categories, an object
may be non-infinite (finite) while its underlying set (if it has one) is infinite.
The computational methodology due to Yarolslav D. Sergeyev for executing
numerical calculations with infinities and infinitesimals is considered from
this categorical point of view.
Keywords: grossone, ①, notation, finite, infinite, generic finite, category
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1 Introduction
We consider the grossone, ①, formalism of Yaroslav Sergeyev [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 16, 15]. See also [18, 19] for other discussions of this structure
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and its applications. This paper begins in the stance that there are no completed
infinite sets. We shall show that the grossone is then naturally interpreted as a
generic finite natural number and that the Sergeyev natural number construction
N= {1,2,3, · · · ,①−2,①−1,①}
can be seen as a generic finite set. By a generic finite set, I mean that N represents
the properties of an arbitrarily chosen finite set of integers taken from 1 to a maxi-
mal integer represented by ①. This means that for any given finite realization of①,
① will be larger than all the other integers in that realization. In this sense, we can
say that ① is larger than any particular integer. The grossone ① is a symbol repre-
senting the highest element in a generic finite set of natural numbers. Infinity is not
the issue here. The issue is clarity of construction and the possibility of calculation
with either limited or unlimited means.
The original intent for the grossone and the set
N= {1,2,3, · · · ,①−2,①−1,①}
was that N should represent the infinity of the natural numbers in a way that makes
the counting of infinity closer to computational issues than does the traditional
Cantorian approach. In Sergeyev’s original approach, N is understood to be an
infinite set, but one does not use the usual property of a Cantorian infinite set that
an infinite set is in 1−1 correspondence with a proper subset of itself. Rather, one
regards special subsets such as the even integers as having their own measurement
as parts of N. For example, in the original approach it is fixed that grossone ① is
even, since it is postulated that the sets of even and odd numbers have the same
number of elements, namely ①/2. Analogously, ①/3,①/4, · · · ,①/n are integral
for finite n. In our approach, which in this sense is a relaxation of the Sergeyev
original approach, we interpret the grossone as a generic natural number and so
it can be interpreted to be either even or odd. We shall see, in Section 2 how
this has specific computational consequences in the summation of series. Both
interpretations are useful. The generic integer intepretation that we use here has
the advantage that the assumptions made are just those that can be applied to finite
sets of natural numbers. This will become apparent as we continue with more
theory and examples.
The present paper is self-contained, and does not take on any axioms from
the work of Sergeyev. We use the notation ① as in the Sergeyev grossone, so
that our work can be compared with his. As we shall see, the result is that a
different conceptual approach, via generic finite sets, has a very close relationship
with the Sergeyev theory of an arithmetic of the infinite! Our theory can be seen as
a relaxation of the Sergeyev theory where we no longer assume that ① is divisible
by arbitrary natural numbers. As explained in Section 3, we adopt the
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Transfer Principle: Any statement P(①), using ①, is true if there is a natural num-
ber N such that P(n) is a true statement about finite natural numbers n for all
n > N.
This is the criterion determining the truth of statements about ①, creating a theory
distinct from the Sergeyev theory, but sharing many of its notations and conceptual
moves. See Section 3 for further discussion and, in particular, with a comparison
with the Axioms of [19].
We reflect here many of these issues in the interpretation of N as a generic finite
set. Our N is not a set but rather a symbolic structure that stands for any finite set.
As a symbolic structure N is inductively defined so that any of the following list of
symbols denotes N :
N= {1, · · · ,①}
N= {1,2, · · · ,①−1,①}
N= {1,2,3, · · · ,①−2,①−1,①}
N= {1,2,3,4 · · · ,①−3,①−2,①−1,①}
· · ·
N= {1,2,3, · · · ,n, · · · ,①−n+1, · · ·①−2,①−1,①}
for any finite natural number n. This means that there are infinitely many possible
symbolic structures that indicate N. Each structure is finite as a symbolic structure.
Depending upon the size of the set to which we shall refer, any and all of these
symbols can be used for the reference. Any given positive integer n can occur, and
does occur, in all such representatives past a certain point. Consequently, we say
that n belongs to N for all natural numbers n. And we say that① can be greater than
any given natural number n. In this form we create a language in which speaking
about N is very similar to speaking about an infinite set, but N, being a symbol
for a generic finite set, is not be interpreted as a Cantorian infinite set. The issues
about subsets and 1−1 correspondences do not arise.
The paper is organized into sections 2,3 and 4 devoted to this point of view
about genericity. The style of writing for sections 2,3 and 4 is sometimes polemic,
as it is written in the form of a speaker who is convinced that only finite sets should
be allowed in mathematics. Infinite sets are seen to be taken care of by the concept
of generic finite set. We show how to apply the grossone formalism by first thinking
about how a computation could be written finitely, and then how it may appear in
the limit where the grossone ① is itself regarded as an infiinite number. Except for
certain situations where we can consider limits as① becomes infinite, we do not use
the original intepretations of the grossone as an infinite quantity. An example of a
situation where one can shift from one interpretation to the other is in a summation
of the form S = Σ①n=1F(n) where F is a function defined on the natural numbers.
For example, consider
Σ①n=12n = 2①+1−1.
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We can regard this as standing for all specific formulas of the type
ΣNn=12n = 2N+1 −1
where N is any natural number, or we can regard it as an generic summation with an
generic result of 2①+1−1. The generic result can be regarded in as formally similar
to the infinite result that comes from taking ① infinite. Both ways of thinking about
the answer tell us how the summation behaves when the number of summands is
① and ① very large. Other examples will be discussed in the body of the paper.
Secion 5 is written from another point of view. In this section we take a cate-
gorical and relative point of view about “being infinite.” We accept that in bare set
theory a set is infinite if it is in 1−1 correspondence with a proper subset of itself.
But in another category we ask that this 1− 1 correspondence be an injection in
that category that is not a surjection. This means, for example, that a circle or a
sphere in the topological category is not infinite (hence finite by definition) since
there is no homeomorphism of a sphere to a proper subset of itself. We examine the
model N for the extended natural numbers from this point of view, and show that it
can be construed as set theoretically infinite, but topologically finite. We hope that
these two points of view for interpretation will enrich the intriguing subject of the
grossone and it uses.
2 The grossone, “Infinite” Series and The Three Dots
In Yaroslav Sergeyev’s theory of numeration, he considers a completion of the
natural numbers
N = {1,2,3, · · · }
to a set that contains an infinite number ①, referred to as grossone. The completion
is denoted by the notation N in the form
N= {1,2, . . . . . . ①−2, ①−1, ①}. (1)
The grossone, ①, behaves “just like” a very large integer, so that N as a set is
conceived to have all of its properties analagous to those of a finite set of integers
such as
Set(N) = {1,2, . . . . . . N−2, N−1, N}.
While Segeyev does not quite explicitly say that N and Set(N) are logical twins
just so long as N is very very large, this is the basic idea that we explore in this
paper. For example, it should not be the case that N should appear infinite in the
sense of having a 1−1 correspondence with a proper subset of itself. Some of the
usual attempts obviously fail. For example if we try to map N to itself by the map
f (k) = k+1 then f (①) =①+1 and so we need a larger domain. This mirrors the
problem for the finite set into the infinite set N.
4
But what set is this N? How should we interpret its two appearances of the
“three dots”? In the case of N the three dots refer to the Peano axioms for the
(usual) natural numbers, assuring us that given a natural number n then there is a
successor to that number indicated by n+1, and that n+1 is never equal to n. The
principle of mathematical induction is then used to characterize the set N . If M
is any subset of N containing 1 and having the property that n ∈ M implies that
(n+1) ∈ M, then M = N .
At first glance one is inclined to guess that N consists in two copies of N , one
ascending
{1,2,3, · · · },
and one descending
{· · ·①−3,①−2,①−1,①}.
If we then take the union
{1,2,3, · · · · · ·①−3,①−2,①−1,①},
is this N? I submit that this is not the desired N. For one thing, if one starts count-
ing upward 1,2, · · · one never leaves the left half of this union. And if one starts
counting down, one never leaves the right half of the union. This is not in analogy
to the large finite set, where either counting down or counting up will cover all of
the territory. Also, there appears to be an injection of the union to itself that is not
a surjection. Just add one to every element of the left half and subtract one from
every element of the right half. All in all, we must search for a different model for
N, or a different category for it to call its home.
I believe that the simplest interpretation for N is that it is a generic finite set.
This means that we interpret ① as a generic “large” natural number. ① is not
any specific natural number unless we want to take it as such. Then since N is a
generically finite set, it has no 1−1 correspondence with a proper subset of itself.
In fact, N is not a set at all. It is a symbolic construct that represents the form of a
finite set. It is not a set just as an algebraic variable x, standing for a number, is not
a number. As such, N has no members, nor does it have any subsets. As a symbolic
construct however, N has some nice features. We all agree on the equalities
N= {1, · · · ,①−1,①},
= {1,2, · · · ,①−2,①−1,①},
= {1,2,3, · · · ,①−3,①−2,①−1,①},
= · · ·
= {1,2,3, · · · ,n, · · · ,①−n,①− (n−1), · · · ,①−3,①−2,①−1,①},
for any specific natural number n. This is the nature of N as a symbolic construct.
In this sense it gives the appearance of acting like an infinite set. This property
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of the notations that we use is an inheritance from the set theory notation where
exactly the same symbolic phenomenon seems to indicate infinity where one only
has the form of a series of numbers and the Peano property of knowing that for a
given n there is an n+ 1. In the usual notation for the set of natural numbers, we
have
N = {1,2,3, · · · ,n, · · · }
for any specific natural number n. Thus we can also regard N as a generic symbol,
but it is a generic symbol that is incomplete if it is to be viewed as representing a
finite set. The symbolic construction for N allows us to start anew and eliminate
the notion of a completed infinity from our work.
If we interpret N as some particular finite set, then it has N members where N
is some specific finite natural number. It can have either an odd or an even number
of members. It is subject to permutations just as any finite set is so subject. The
availability of such interpretations makes our viewpoint different from the original
interpretation of the grossone. In the original interpretation, ① is always infinite,
and it is divisible by any natural number. In our interpretation ① as a symbolic
entity is not a finite natural number. It stands for any top value in some finite set,
but not any particular value. For this reason we can do arithmetic with ① and say
that ① is taken to be greater than n for any standard natural number n and that
①−1 <①<①+1 < 2①.
In the generic context, for a statement about ① to be true, it must be true for
all sufficiently large substitutions of natural numbers for ①. For example ①> 2100
is true because N > 2100 is true for all natural numbers N that are larger than 2100.
Some statements are true for all numbers. Thus 2① > ① is true since 2N > N for
all natural numbers N. In this way, we can use the grossone as an infinite number
when we wish.
Series of the form
Σ①k=1ak,
where ak are any real or complex numbers or algebraic expressions, are well de-
fined. For example, we can write
S = S(①) = 1+ x+ x2 + · · ·+ x①,
and this is a generic finite sum in the form of a geometric series. We can operate
algebraically on such sums. For example,
xS = x(1+ x+ x2 + · · ·+ x①) = x+ x2 + · · ·+ x①+ x①+1,
whence
(1− x)S = 1− x①+1,
and so, for x 6= 1
S(①) = 1− x
①+1
1− x .
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Note that we can replace ① in this formula. For example, S(2①) = 1−x2①+11−x .
It is our intent to keep the interpretation that ① is a generic natural number, so in
this sense S(①) can be regarded as specializing to the function S(n) = 1−xn+11−x , for
natural numbers n. But S(①) is also the generic expression for this function, and as
such we can think of it as expressing cases where n is taken to infinity.
At this point we can note the effects of taking ① even or odd, or the effect of
taking a limit as① becomes arbitrarily large. For example if the absolute value of x
is less than 1, then x①+1 becomes arbitrarily small as ① becomes arbitrarily large.
Generically, we can regard ① as an infinite number if we wish. In that case we
have that S is infinitesimally close to 11−x , but the expression S =
1−x①+1
1−x is a more
accurate rendition of the actual situation. Working with generic formalism allows
us to dispense with limits in many cases and adds detail that can be sometimes
ignored in the usual category of working with limits.
Note in the last example, that if we take x =−1, then
S = 1− (−1)
①+1
2
=
1+(−1)①
2
.
If we take① even, then S = 1. If we take① to be odd, thn S= 0. We see that (−1)①
is a well-defined symbolic value that can be either positive or negative, depending
on its instantiation as a number. This is in direct contrast to Sergeyev’s usage for
the grossone, where ① is taken to be even and so S takes only the value 1. Our
interpretation reflects the fact that the corresponding finite series oscillate between
0 and 1.
Here is another example. Let
E(x) = (1+
x
①)
①.
This is of course a rendition of (1+ x/N)N for large generic N. We can apply the
binomial theorem to conclude that
E(x) = 1+
①
1! (
x
①)+
①(①−1)
2! (
x
①)
2 + · · ·+ ①(①−1)(①−2) · · · (1)①! (
x
①)
①.
Thus
E(x) = 1+
x
1! +
①(①−1)
①2
x2
2! +
①(①−1)(①−2)
①3
x3
3! + · · ·+(
x
①)
①
From this expression we can see the limit structure that leads to the usual series
formula for
ex = 1+
x
1! +
x2
2! +
x3
3! + · · · ,
and we see the luxury in the exact formula for E(x). By not taking the limit and
examining the exact structure of the formula for large generic ①, we see more and
can write down more exact approximations for specific values N substituted for the
generic ①.
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Another example will show even more. Let
P= {p1, p2, · · · , p①−1, p①}
denote a list of all the prime numbers up to a generic natural number ①. Note
that p① denotes a generic prime number. This can be compared with Sergeyev’s
concept of infinite prime numbers [16].
Define an analogue of the Riemann Zeta function via
Z(s) = [
1
1− 1ps1
][
1
1− 1ps2
] · · · [ 1
1− 1ps①
] = Σ
n∈N(①)
1
ns
.
Here N(①) denotes all natural numbers that can be constructed as products of prime
powers from the set of primes P. Note that there is no limit to the size of elements
of N(①). If we wish to keep bounds on that, we will have to introduce further
notation. Even though Z(s) is a finite product, it produces natural numbers of
arbitrarily high size. Thus a better finite zeta function will be given by
ZZ(s) = Π①k=1(1+ p−sk + p
−2s
k + · · ·+ p−①sk ).
Then
ZZ(s) = Σ
n∈N(①,①)
1
ns
where N(①,①) denotes the generically finite set of natural numbers whose prime
factorization is from the first ① primes, and whose prime powers are no higher
than ①. For a particular finite instantiation of ① this zeta function, being a finite
sum, can be computed for any complex number s. This truncation of the usual
limit version of the zeta function allows new computational investigations of its
properties. This example can be compared with the work in [16] and [19]. One
possible advantage of our approach is that it is essentially a finite approach. We are
suggesting that it is useful to examine the Rieman zeta function, defined just for
a finite collection of prime numbers, and then to examine how these finitized zeta
functions behave as the number of primes used gets larger and larger. We are not
concerned here with extra fine structure of the zeta function at its limit, but rather
with extra structure visible in the finite approximations to it. This material will be
explored further in a separate paper.
But the reader may ask, does not the construction of N connote an infinite set
if we regard the grossone ① as standing for an infinite evaluation, larger than any
natural number? Well, dear reader, what will you have? Should we not be able,
in this putative infinity, to count down from ① by successive subtractions to some
number that we found by counting up from 1 by successive additions? This is true
of any finite set. Yet if this is true then it must be that for some natural numbers
n,m we have
n =①−m
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and so we find that
n+m =①
and so the set N would be neither generic, nor infinite, but simply one of the mul-
titude of finite sets, in fact, the one of the form
{1,2,3, · · · ,n+m−2,n+m−1,n+m}.
Once again,
N= {1,2,3, · · · ,①−2,①−1,①}
is not a set at all, but the form of a generic finite set. It is a symbol for the finite set
structure, not a set at all. But this gives us freedom to regard this symbolic structure
as something like a set, and in it, we indeed cannot countdown from the grossone
to a finite natural number.
3 Infinity and the Generic Finite - The Transfer Principle
In many aspects of mathematics there is no need for any infinite set. It is suffi-
cient to have the concept of a generic finite set. For this we need the notion of a
generic natural number. Thus one speaks of the set of natural numbers from 1 to n,
{1,2,3, · · ·n− 2,n− 1,n}, and one usually conceives this as referring to some, as
yet unspecified number n. One writes a formula such as
1+2+ · · ·+n = n(n+1)/2,
and it is regarded as true for any specific number n. The concept of a generic n
requires a shift of attention, but no actual change in the formalism of handling
finite sets and finite series. To write
1+2+ · · ·+①=①(①+1)/2
is conceptually different from the above formula with n. In the formula with n we
are referring to some specific natural number n. In the formula with grossone, we
are indicating a form that is true when ① is replaced by a specific integer n, and we
are also indicating the behaviour of a corresponding limit or infinite sum.
The Transfer Principle. Once we take a notation for a generic natural number
as with Sergeyev’s grossone, we are lead to use the concept of genericity. In this
view ① is symbolic, not infinite, but can be regarded as indefinitely large. We
can regard it as larger than any given number that is named. This is a way of
thinking instantiated by our Transfer Principle: Any statement P(①), using ①, is
true if there is a natural number N such that P(n) is a true statement about finite
natural numbers n for all n > N. This principle provides a transfer statement that
allows us to apply the grossone in many particular situations. The principle and its
consequences are distinct from the Sergeyev use of the grossone, and constitute a
relaxation of that usage.
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For example, if we are working with a computer that is limited to a specific
size of natural number, then from the outside, as theorists, we can easily say that
① will be greater than any number allowed in that computational domain. We can
think of N = {1,2,3, · · · ,①− 2,①− 1,①} as a set that is larger than any specific
finite set we care to name, but it is still generically finite and does not partake of
the Cantorian property of being in 1− 1 correspondence with a proper subset of
itself. It is like a finite set, but it is not any particular finite set.
The concept of a generic set is different from the concept of a set in the same
way that the variable x is different from a specific number in elementary algebra. A
generic set such as N does not have a cardinality in the sense of Cantor. It is not in
1−1 correspondence with any specific finite set, but if a specific natural number n
is given for ①, then the resulting set is of cardinality n. This is precisely analogous
to the situation with an algebraic x that in itself has no numerical value, but any
subsititution of a number for x results in the specific value of that number. Just as
we endow algebraic expressions with the same properties as the numbers that they
abstract, we endow generic sets with the properties of the finite sets which they
stand for.
The Zhigljavsky Axioms. The Transfer Principle can be compared with axiom-
atizations for the Sergeyev system. For example, in [19], Zhigljavsky takes the
following set of axioms:
1. Grossone, ① is the largest natural number so that N= {1,2,3, · · · ,①−1,①}.
2. The grossone ① is divisible by any finite natural number n.
3. If a certain statement is valid for all n large enough, then this statement is
also valid for ①.
4. Assume we have a numerical sequence {bn}∞n=1 which converges to 0 as
n−→∞. Then this sequence has a grossone-based representative {b1,b2, · · ·b①}
whose last term b① is necessarily an infinitesimal quantity.
We see that Axiom 1 corresponds to our formalization of N as a generic set of con-
sective natural numbers. But we do not use formally the concept of the “set of all
natural numbers”. We do not assume Axiom 2. Our transfer principle is essentially
the same as Axiom 3. We agree with Axiom 4 in the sense that one has the generic
set {b1,b2, · · ·b①}, and the symbol b① can be used to stand for a number whose
absolute value is less than that of any given finite non-zero real number. (In fact it
follows from the Transfer Principle that |b①|< 1/n for any positive natural number
n.) This means that in both our system and in the Zhigljavsky system, infinitesi-
mals naturally arise. How they are treated may depend upon the further adoption
of a theory of extended real analysis and is left open for specific applications.
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Our point in this paper has been that the symbolic constructions of Yaroslav
Sergeyev can be regarded as generic finite sets. Does this preclude an infinite
interpretation? In the case of a series such as
S = 1+ x+ x2 + · · ·+ x① = 1− x
①+1
1− x
(x not equal to 1), we would like to give the interpretation that if ① is an infinite
integer, and |x| < 1, then S is infinitesimally close to 1/(1− x). The problem with
this is the same as the corresponding problem in the calculus. An integral is a limit
of finite summations. We are led to imagine (by the Leibniz [1, 2] notation for
example) that the integral ∫
∞
−∞
e−x
2/2dx
is an uncountably infinite sum of infinitesimal terms of the form e−x2/2dx. It takes
the language of non-standard analysis [3] to make formal sense out of this state-
ment. We can, using the grossone formalism, go in the other direction and articulate
that integral as a generic finite sum. In order to do this we have to make a choice of
method of integration and then write the formula in generic fashion. For example,
consider ∫
∞
−∞
f (x)dx.
We use Riemann integration and choose an interval from −n to n on the real line.
We divide the interval [−n,n] up into sub-intervals of length 1/n. This gives the
partition
{−n2/n,(−n2 +1)/n,(−n2 +2)/n, · · · ,−1/n,0,1/n,2/n, · · · ,(n2 −1)/n,n2/n}
of the interval [−n,n]. We then have that, when the integral converges,
∫
∞
−∞
f (x)dx = limitn−→∞ Σk=n2k=−n2
f (k/n)
n
.
Thus the following finite generic expression stands for this integral.
Σ①
2
k=−①2 f (
k
①)
1
① .
We can even write
∫
∞
−∞
e−x
2/2dx = lim Σ①
2
k=−①2E(
k2
2①)
1
①
where E(x) is our finite version of the exponential function from the previous sec-
tion. Here lim F(①) = limn−→∞ F(n) where the limit is the classical limit and n
runs over the classical natural numbers. We cannot write a limit as ① approaches
something since ① is generic and does not approach anything other than itself.
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Let us write a .= b to mean that a and b differ by an infinitesimal amount (in
the sense of the discussion above) or, equivalently, that lima = limb. Thus
1− x①+1
1− x
.
=
1
1− x
when |x|< 1. Note that a .= b has the following properties, making it an equivalence
relation (the first three properties) and more.
1. a .= a for any a.
2. If a .= b, then b .= a.
3. If a .= b and b .= c then a .= c.
4. if a .= b and c .= d then a+b .= c+d and ac .= bd.
5. If a .= b then a1/n .= b1/n where x1/n denotes the prinicipal n-th root of the
number x (working over the complex numbers). This implies that
a1/① .= b1/①
in appropriate cases where one checks the limiting behaviour.
6. If 1/① .= ε where ε is infinitesimal, then it may happen that 1 .=①ε. In this
case one must examine the size of ε in relation to the size of 1/①.
Here is an example. In the derivation that follows we will use all of the above
properties of a .= b, and we leave it for the reader to check that each of the steps is
valid. We have the classical formula
eiθ = cos(θ)+ isin(θ).
This is often seen as a consequence of the series formula for ex. We can write the
equation
(1+
iθ
① )
① .= cos(θ)+ i sin(θ).
In particular, the well-known formula eipi =−1 becomes the following generic limit
formula
(1+
ipi
① )
① .=−1.
In fact, we can, since this formula refers to properties of all formulas where ① is
replaced by a specific integer, take roots and solve for pi as follows.
(1+ ipi① )
① .=−1
1+ ipi①
.
= (−1)
1
①
12
ipi
①
.
= (−1)
1
① −1
ipi .=①((−1)
1
① −1)
pi
.
=
①((−1)
1
① −1)
i
One can verify that this last limit formula is indeed a correct limit formula for pi.
Well-known limit formulas appear from this formula when we replace ① by 2① in
it. We then have
pi
.
=
2①((−1)
1
2① −1)
i
In this version the finite versions are of the form
2N((−1) 12N −1)
i
and the limit formula is
pi = limN−→∞
2N((−1) 12N −1)
i
pi = limN−→∞2NImag((−1)
1
2N ),
where Imag denotes the imaginary part of the given complex number. Here we
have successive square roots of −1 and we can use the formula
√
a+bi =
√
(1+a)/2+ i
√
(1−a)/2
when a2 +b2 = 1. From this it is easy to derive the famous formula of Vie`te :
pi =
2√
1
2
√
1
2 +
1
2
√
1
2
√
1
2 +
1
2
√
1
2 +
1
2
√
1
2 · · ·
The grossone notation and the notion of generic finite sets allows us to write this
derivation in a concise and precise manner.
4 Limits, Ordinals and Further Relaxations
In articulating the notion of the generic finite we have examined an interpretation
of the grossone extension of the natural numbers of Yaroslav Sergeyev as a generic
finite set. This works because the grossone extension puts a cap, the grossone ①, at
the top of its model of the natural numbers and so formally resembles our way of
thinking about a finite set such as {1,2,3} where there is a least element, a greatest
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element, and a size for the set in the numerical sense of counting or ordinality. By
working with this correspondence we may end up with evaluations of size that are
dfferent than the Sergeyev theory. As case in point is the finite sets of even natural
numbers.
{2},
{2,4},
{2,4,6},
· · ·
{2,4,6,8, · · · ,2n}.
The generic set of even natural numbers is
E = {2,4,6,8, · · · 2①}.
This notation is different from the way Sergeyev would denote the even natural
numbers, since he would place them “inside” the set
N= {1,2,3, · · · ,①−2,①−1,①}.
As such there could be no appearance of 2① in the Sergeyev representation of the
even numbers. In Sergeyev’s language the size of the set of even natural numbers
is ①/2, since it comprises half of the natural numbers. We can discuss size in our
way by the transfer principle of the previous section. The size of a specific finite
set of even numbers
{2,4,6, · · · 2n}
is the number of elements of the set, which is n in this case. If the size for the
specializations (replacing ① by specific natural numbers n) of a generic set X has
the form F(n) for a function F of natural numbers, then we say that X has size
F(①). Thus we assign ① as the size for E above. This moves our theory in the
direction of Cantorian counting for sets even though we have not invoked a notion
of 1−1 correspondence for infinite sets. The point of this example is to show that
there are are natural differences between the generic finite set approach and the
Sergeyev approach to the grossone.
There are other relationships of the generic finite set concept and standard set
theory. For example, in standard set theory we take as representative ordinals
0 = {},
1 = {0},
2 = {0,1},
3 = {0,1,2},
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and so the generic finite ordinal is
G = {0,1, · · · ,①}.
This should be held in contrast to the first infinite ordinal
ω = {0,1,2, · · · }.
The generic finite ordinal has ①+1 members and so we could name it
①+1 = {0,1, · · · ,①}
in the tradition of making ordinals. However, ordinals made in this generic fashion
are not well-ordered since there is no end to the descending sequence ①,①−1,①−
2, . · · · . This means that a theory of ordinals based on generic finite sets will have a
character of its own. This will be the subject of a separate paper.
5 Grossone and Infinity Relative to a Category
In this section, we take a different approach to the grossone. We assume here the
existence of infinite sets and the usual terminology of point set topology. With that
we discuss, by using categories, relative notions of infinity. After all, a circle is not
homeomorphic to any proper subset of itself. Therefore the point set for the circle,
uncountable in pure set theory, is finite in the category of topological spaces! We
formalize this notion below and indicate how it can be interfaced with the grossone.
We recall that a category C is a collection of objects and morphisms where a
morphism is associated to two objects and is usually written as f : A −→ B where
A and B are objects. Note that the morphism f provides a directed arrow from A to
B. Without further axioms the concept of a category is the same as the concept of
a directed multi-graph. The axioms for a category are as follows:
1. Given morphisms f : A −→ B and g : B −→C, there is a well-defined mor-
pism called the composition of f and g and denoted
g◦ f : A −→ B.
The object A is called the domain of f and the object B is called the codomain
or range of f .
2. Every object A has a unique identity morphism
1A : A −→ A
such that for any f : A −→ B, f ◦1A = f and for any g : B −→ A, 1A ◦g = g.
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3. If f : A −→ B, g : B −→C and h : C −→ D, then
h◦ (g◦ f ) = (h◦g)◦ f .
Thus composition of morphisms is associative.
If C and C′ are categories, then we say that a functor from C to C′, denoted
F :C−→C′, is a function that takes objects to objects and morphisms to morphisms
such that if f : A −→ B is a morphisim in C, then F( f ) : F(A) −→ F(B) is a
morphism in C′. Furthermore, we require of a functor that identity morphisms are
carried to identity morphisms, and that compositions are taken to compositions in
the sense that F( f ◦g) = F( f )◦F(g) for all compositions f ◦g in C.
In this paper we will use categories whose objects are sets and whose mor-
phisms are maps of these sets with whatever extra structure is demanded by that
category. Then there is a forgetful functor FG : C −→ Sets obtained by just taking
the objects as sets and the morphisms as maps of sets, ignoring the extra struc-
ture. In such categories, a morphism f : A −→ B is said to be injective if FG( f ) is
injective in Sets, and f is said to be surjective if FG( f ) is surjective in Sets.
In Sets one says that a set A is infinite if there exists an injection i : A−→ A that
is not a surjection. If every injection of A to itself is a surjection, we say that the
the set A is finite. We relativize this notion to other categories. If C is a set-based
category, we say that an object A of C is finite (in C ) if every injection of A to
itself in the category C is surjective. For example consider the category T op of
topological spaces. We see at once that the circle
S1 = {(x,y)|x2 + y2 = 1}
where x,y are real numbers, is finite in this category since the circle is not homeo-
morphic to any proper subset of itself. Thus, while the circle consists in infinitely
many points when looked at under the forgetful functor to set theory, in the topo-
logical category the circle is finite. We shall see that this point of view on finite
and infinite is very useful in sorting out how we deal with mathematical objects in
many situtations.
We now combine this topological point of view on finiteness with the grossone.
In Figure 1 we show an embedding of a union of two sets of points in the form
N= {1,2,3,3, · · · · · · ,①−3,①−2,①−1,①}.
(In the Figure, ① is denoted by G.) We regard N as embedded in a circle with
two points removed. The two vertical marks on the circle in the figure denote
the removed points. The circle with two points removed partakes of the subspace
topology from the Euclidean plane in which it is embedded. We work in the cat-
egory of orientation preserving homeomorphisms of the deleted circle S that map
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Figure 1: Grossone Circle
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Figure 2: Grossone Graphs
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the the intervals [i, i+ 1] and [①− i,①− i+ 1] to themselves. In the categorical
sense, S is finite and there can be no such homeomorphisms that take N to a proper
subset of itself. In fact, in this model, every such homeomorphism is the identity
map when restricted to N.
In Figure 2 we give another example of how to topologically make an infinite
set finite. We have labeled a set of graphs with the “elements” of N. None of these
graphs are homeomorphic (we take the nodes of the graphs to be disks and the
edges to be topological intervals)and so a homeomorphism of the entire collection
must take each graph to itself. There is no topological injection of the collection of
graphs to a subcollection of itself.
We produce this model to suggest some ways to view N as infinite and yet finite
without paradox. I am sure that other models will emerge in relation to applications
of these ideas.
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